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nl THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'.fILFORD ;, . HANSEi and VAfJA J. 
i!A:,SEN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
JOHH J. STEWART and ALICE E.K. 
STEWART, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Respondents 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Suprane Court No. 19393 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action is to determine the rights of the parties to a strip of 
property bounded on the north by and east-west line 620 feet south of 
the north fence line of Respondents' pasture and bounded on the south by 
an existing fence, claimed by Respondents to be their southern boundary 
(see map attached to Appellants Brief) The action was originally 
terrred a quiet title action. However, Appellants concede that the 
action might more properly be termed one in ejectment. 
Respondents stipulated prior to trial that they have no claim to 
the disputed property through boundary by agreement or acquiescence, 
adverse possession, or prescriptive easanent and have acquired no title 
thereto except under their deed from Albern Allen, a ccmron grantor of 
Appellants' and Respondents' properties. 
The single issue for trial was the original location of the 
:-lortheast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, Providence Survey of Farms. 
Respondents claimed shortly before trial that their surveyor, Randy 
Bott, by recent survey, had determined that the dortheast corner of Lot 
12, Block 34 Providence Survey of Farms relied upon by Appellants and 
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others was 33 feet north of its origi11:il loc3tion ,mJ tlul ,\ppdl:mts 
were as a matter of lciw (see Exhibit .j) requireJ to move their conier Le> 
a point 33 feet south which ResponJents believed woulJ entitle them to 
possession of the disputed ground. 
DISPOSITIOl< U LOWER COURT 
Respondents were granted a jury trial over Appellants' objections. 
The jury found in favor of Respondents. Appellants moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. Appellants' ~lotion was 
denied. Appellants now appeal both the Judgment of the District Ccurt 
and the denial of their M:Jtion. 
RELIEF SOUQIT OU APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully request that the Judgment entered in favor 
of Respondents be vacated, and that judgment be entered in favor pf 
Appellants or that a new trial be granted. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
1. The facts relevant to a determination of the location of the 
:'ortheast Ccrner of Lot 12, Block 34 Providence Survey of Fanns are not 
in dispute (see Appellants' Brief, Surrrna.ry of Evidence, p. 2-7 anJ 
compare with Defendants' Brief, Statement of Facts, p. 2-3). 
2. Respondents' measurements to known points on the ground do not 
differ significantly from those presented by Appellants. 
3. The location points for the Scutheast corner of Lot 12, Bleck 
34 and the N::lrtheast corner of Lot 17, Block .'J (see map attached to 
Appellants' Brief) are agreed upon and the distance between them i ·; 
agreed to be 2733 feet. 
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4. The distdnces and descriptions set forth in the various deeds 
.ffe not disputed. 
5. The existence and location of various fences are accepted. 
6. The existence and location of the present lines of possession 
are not disputed (except for a single Hansen/Stewart bOt.ll'ldary). 
7. The purpose of the various plats sul:mitted was agreed upon. 
8. All surveyors agree that there is no original m:murnent at the 
location of the :'ortheast O::>rner of L:lt 12, Block 34, Providence Survey 
of Farms. 
9. All parties agree that, in spite of the representation of a 
4-rod rod on some of the lll10fficial plats of the area, only a 33-foot 
gravel lane has ever been established on the grolll1d. 
10. All survevors agree that all of the deeds in the area will 
require reforrm.tion in the event Respondents prevail (T. V. II, pp. 38- 39, 
p. 139) . 
11. All parties agree that the )lortheast corner of L:lt 12, Block 
34, Providence Survey of Farms as relied upon by the deed writers and as 
actually possessed is at the location claimed by Appellants. 
ARGUMENTS 
Appellants submit the following argunents in reply to the pcints 
raised in Respondents' Brief. 
The location of the i'ortheast O::>rner of L:lt 12, Block 34, 
Providence Fam Survey was the single issue to be detemined at trial. 
If the above phrase means "the location of the Northeast Corner of 
1.Dt 12, Block 34, Providence Fam Survey as intended by the camx:m 
grantor of the parties and as used as the beginning point in Appellants' 
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deeds" then the matter is easily resolved in favor of AppelL11ts. 
Respondents do not dispute, and in fact t!-teir evidence supports the 
contention that the corner as possessed and relied on is and has ahJays 
been at the location Appellants claim (T.V.11,p.123-129). Respondents 
merely claim that the corner was relied upon by mistake since it was 
first established. 
If the above phrase means "the location of the e<ortheast Corner of 
Lot 12, Block 34, Providence Farm Survey as intended by the original 
surveyor" which being once established is a point on the earth which 
cannot be moved as a matter of law, the trial court should have 
determined whether the corner was 
(a) an existent corner 
(b) an obliterated corner 
(c) a lost corner. 
])Jrsey v. Ryan, Ill.App. 442 N.E.2d 639 (1982) citing the Bureau of L~1d 
Mmagement' s manual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public hmds 
of the United States: 
(W)e think that the authorities differentiate 
between three types of corners, tw:i of which llB.Y be 
relied upon to ascertain a lost corner. In the 
rmnual previously referred to, three different types 
of corners are noted and defined. 
An existent corner is one whose position can be 
identified by verifying the evidence of the roonument 
or its accessories, by reference to the description 
in the field notes, or located by an acceptable 
supplemental survey record, some physical evidence, 
or testiroony. 
San Juan County v. Ayer, 604 P.2d 1304 (Wash.App., 1930) citing the 
M'l.nual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public lands of the L~1ited 
States-1973, Sections 5-9 at p .130 (1973 :·Janual): 
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,\J1 obliterated comer is one at whose point there 
<1n: 110 rermining traces of the monument or its 
dCcessories, but whose location has been 
perpetlldted, or the point for which may be recovered 
bevond reasonable doubt by the acts and testimony of 
the interested landowners, competent surveyors, or 
other qualified local authorities, or witnesses, or 
by some acceptable record evidence. 
A lost corner is a point of a survey whose position 
cannot be detennined, beyond reasonable doubt, 
either from traces of the ongJ.nal markS or from 
acceptable evidence or testimony that bears upon the 
original position, and whose location can be 
restored only be reference to one or m:ire 
interdependent (i.e., nearby, adjacent) corners. 
Manual Section 5-20 at 133. 
A proportionate measunment is :me that gives equal 
relative weight to all parts of the line. The 
excess or deficiency between t'Ml existent comers is 
so distributed that the am:iunt given to each 
interval bears the same proportion to the whole 
difference as the record length of the interval 
bears to the whole record distance. :13.nual Section 
5-24 at 133. 
(see also wrsev v. 2.yan, Ill. App. 442 :J.E. 2d 639 
(1982) supra.) 
All parties agree that there is no survey monument at the corner. 
The corner is therefore by definition either an obliterated corner or a 
lost corner (~lanual of Surveying Instructions - 1973, p. 129 ff). 
If the comer is obliterated then its location nrust have been 
perpetuated by "best evidence" beyond a reasonable doubt. Henrie v. 
Hyer, 70 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1937) quoting from the General I.and Office 
pamphlet 1909 on Restoration of Lost or Obliterated Corners, etc. p.5: 
An obliterated corner is one where no visible 
evidence rermins of the work of the original 
surveyor in establishing it. Its location may, 
however, have been preserved beyond all question by 
acts of land owners, and by the marory of those who 
knew and recollect the true situs of the original 
ITDnun-ent. In such case it is not a lost comer. 
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Dorsey v. Ryan, (supra.) 
The direction in (Irvin v. Rotramel, 68 Ill. 11, 
(1873)) to establish lost con;ers ov reference to 
known govenirnent corners requires, ·at a minimum, 
reference to an obliterated con1er which is one 
whose location mav be recovered bevond a reasonable 
doubt by the testim:::my of landowne"rs, witnesses, or 
acceptable record evidence. 
Henrie v. Hyer, (supra.) 
It is conceded, as it must be, that the original 
corners as established by the government surveyors, 
if they can be found, or the places where they were 
originally established, if that can be definitely 
determined, are conclusive on all persons owning or 
clah-nirlg to hold with reference to such survey and 
the roonuments placed by the original surveyor 
without regard to whether they were correctly 
located or not. Surveyors, in making resurveys or 
in searching for or relocating or re-establishing 
lost or obliterated corners, may consider extrinsic 
and material evidence, as well as the tield notes, 
if there is doubt or uncertaintv in the field notes, 
for the purpose of determining the exact location of 
lost lines or corners of the original survey. 
~lonuments control over courses and distances. 
Washington Rock Co. v. Young, 2 9 Utah, 108 , 80 P. 
382, 110 Am.St.Rep. 666. 
Staff v. Bilder, 415 P.2d 650 (Wash 1966) citing Stewart v. Hoffman, 61" 
Wash.2d 37, 390 P 2d 553 (1964) and 11 C.J.S. Boundaries Section 49c 
(1938) • 
Courts should ascertain and carry out the intention 
of the original platters. ln_~-~se of discrepancy. 
however, between lines actually marked or surveyed 
on the ground and lines called for by plats, maps or 
field notes, the lines marked by s1irvey on the 
ground prevail save for intervening equities arising 
by contract, conveyance, estoppel, prescription, or 
the application of well-defined legal and equitable 
concepts. 
(see also Clark, Surveying and Boundaries Section 
258 (3rd ed. 1959)). 
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Washington .lickel C!ining & Alloys, Inc. v. 11artin, 534 P.2d 59 (Wash. 
App. 1975) citing Inrmn v. Pearson, 47 Hash. 402, 92 P. 279: 
But it does not follow that, if there be evidence of 
a corner which has been destroyed or obliterated by 
the lapse of time, a court will direct the 
establishment of a corner under the rule stated, or 
any other rule, for the law establishes an 
obliterated corner where the surveyor actually 
located it, and not where it ought to be located by 
a correct survey. 
In the event a survey using the "obliterated corner" 
as the point of beginning fails to resolve the 
dispute between the parties, then the parties may 
seek a detennination of the location of the disputed 
bcundary line in a future action. 
If the corner is not located bevond a reasonable doubt , it is a 
lost corner and rrust be reestablished by proportionate measurement 
C:·l3.nual of Surveying Instructions-1973, p. 133, supra.) Henrie v. Hyer, 
supra. 
A lost corner is one whose position cannot be 
determined beyond reasonable doubt, either from 
original marks or reliable external evidence. 
Resort should be had, first, to the monuments placed 
at the various corners when the original government 
survey of the land was made, provided they are still 
in existence and can be identified, or can be 
relocated by the aid of any attainable data. But if 
this cannot be done and a survey becanes necessary, 
this rrust be made from the east, and not fran the 
west, bcundary line of the township (113.son v. 
Braught, 33 S.D. 559, 146 N.W. 687, 688.) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Cornia v. Putnam, 489 P. 2d 1001 (Utah 
1971). stated: 
In the relocation or re-establishnent of government 
corners there is a distinction drawn between an obliter~ted corner and a lost corner; in the 
fonrer the investi"'ation is directed toward the 
determination of its ~riginal location; while in the 
latter, the corner is relocated by a new survey ... 
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A lost comer is one which c::umot be replaced bv 
reference to any existing data or sources of 
inforrmtion, although it is not necessary that 
evidence of its physical location may be seen or 
that one who has seen the marked corner be produced. 
A comer will not be regarded as lost where it may 
be located by field notes referring to discoverable 
natural objects (Chandler v. Hibberd, 165 011.App.:Zd 
39, 332 P.2d 133, 141 (1958)). 
In Reid V. Dunn, 201 011.App.2d 612, 20 011.Rptr. 
273, 275 (1962) the Court observed that if there be 
some acce table evidence of the ori inal location, 
that osition will be o ill pre erence to the 
rule that would be app ie to a ost comer. The 
Court stated: 
"(I)f monuments are obliterated and undiscoverable, 
comers should be re-established wherever possible 
in accordance with natural objects described in the 
field notes of the original survey. And the 
proportional method must not be resorted to l.lllless 
the line cannot be retraced and its comers 
relocated by reference to natural objects of the 
field notes and all other prescribed :nethods fail." 
(see also \vashington Jickel Mining & Alloys, Inc. v. 
~13.rin, supra citing Martin v. :~eeley, 55 Wash. 2d 
~222-23, 347 P.2d 529, 530 (1959).) 
Dorsey v. Ryan, supra. 
All lost section and quarter-section comers on the 
township bo=dary lines will be restored by single 
ro ortionate measurE!Ilent between the nearest 
identirie corners on op site si es o t e missu1° 
corner, north and south on a meri ional line or east 
and west on a latitudinal line. 
United States v. Citko, 517 F.Supp. 233 (1931) 
For a corner to be lost it "must be so completely 
lost that (it) cannot be replaced by reference to 
any existing data or other sources of inforrmtion." 
(cites omitted.) The decision that a comer is lost 
should not be made l.llltil everv means has been 
exercised that might aid in iJentifving its true 
original position. (cite omitted). Even though the 
physical evidence of a corner may have entirely 
disappeared, a comer cannot be regarded as lost if 
its position can be recovered through the testim:Jny 
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of one or more witnesses who have a dependable 
knowledge of the original location. 
Appellants presented evidence at trial to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the i'lortheast Corner of l.Dt 12, Block 34 
Providence Fann Survey is located at the point frequently referred to as 
the "L3.rsen Fence Corner". 'This they accomplished by the unrefuted 
evidence regarding old fences erected along the lines of possession of 
various lot owners, record titles, measurements between known points, 
unofficial plats, an aerial photo, and the testimony of experts in 
survey law, according to the procedures set forth in the M3.nual of 
Surveying Instructions - 1973, supra. 
Respondents did not refute Appellants' evidence, but merely added 
some measurements derived from the scaled dimensions of the Martineau 
Plat. Respondents then disputed the legal significance and legal 
interpretation of the evidence. Respondents claim that their evidence 
is legally sufficient to establish the corner as they claim in spite of 
not following the procedures set forth in the MIDual of Surveying 
Instructions - 1973. Appellants claim that Respondents present no 
evidence which either legally or sufficiently supports their position, 
even if viewed in the light most favorable to their case. Respondents' 
interpretation of their own evidence fails to establish anything except 
some non-probative distances on t::he ground which do not conclusively 
establish their claim or refute Appellants' claim beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
\men the facts of this case are interpreted according to survey 
law, reasonable minds cannot differ as to the outcome of this case. 
There is no factual dispute to be determined by a jury. 
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Even if the Appellants' eviJence, as vieweJ in the Jighl imst 
favorable to Respondents' case. were ruled l'Ol to es ta bl i sh L1'e cun•er 
beyond a reasonable doubt and the con1er were thus ruled to be lost 
rather than obliterated, Appellants should still prevail because their 
surveyor has already gone through the procedures for restoring a lost 
corner as set forth in the !13.nual of Surveying Instructions - 1973 p. 
133, ie. through single proportionate measurement. Respondents have not 
even attempted such a restoration. 
Appellants now discuss general Arguments and will later reply to 
Respondents' Brief point by point. 
Argurrent 1. What evidence is necessary and how it is to be used to 
establish the position of a disputed corner beyond a reasonable doubt is 
a matter of law, established over many years, after '11UCh practical 
experience, and docl.llilented in numerous cases (see Henrie v. Hyer , supra . 
Cornia v Putnam, supra, San Juan v. Ayer, supra, Dorsev v. R'.'an. supra. 
United States v. Citko , supra, Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, infra, Hook 
v. Horner, infra, etc.) The cases refer to the ~lanual of Surveying 
Instructions, based in part on 43 U.S.C. Sections 751, 752, and 753, and 
published by the L'. S. Deparonent of the Interior, and use it as a 
primary source of lawful survey procedure. Chapter V entitled 
"Restoration of Lost or Obliterated Corners" and the pamphlets based 
thereon are especially applicable to the present case. Utah, 
1.Jashington, Idaho, Illinois and ~bntana all, as a matter of law, require 
surveyors to follow the procedures outlined in the '·lanual. 
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&lrbizon of Utah, Inc. v. General Oil Company, 471 P.2d 148 (Utah 
1970) citing Vaught v. McClyroond 144 P. 2d 612 (Mont 1945) and 43 
U.S.C.A. Sections 751, 752, and 753: 
When lands are granted according to an official plat 
of a survey, the plat itself, with all its notes, 
lines, descriptions and landmrrks, becomes as l!IlJCh a 
part of the grant or deed by which they are 
conveyed, and controls so far as limits are 
concerned, as if such descriptive features were 
written out on the fact of the deed or grant 
itself ... 
Congress has provided a system for the survey of 
public lands, and the boundaries and limits of the 
several sections and subdivisions thereof, including 
quarter sections , must be ascertained in conformity 
with the principles laid down in the federal 
statutes ... 
To find the corrm::m corner or quarter sections or the 
legal center of a section of land, straight lines 
must be run from the quarter section corners on the 
boundary of the section to the opposite quarter 
comers, the point of intersection constituting the 
legal center, and the boundary line between two 
quarters cannot be legally established by measuring 
along one side of the section 160 rods, ... 
But the government surveys are, as a matter of law, 
the best evidence; and, if the boundaries of land 
are clearly established thereby, other evidence is 
superfluous and may be excluded; the best evidence 
is the corners actually fixed upon the ground bt the 
government surveyor, in defaUlt of Which the ield 
notes and plats come next, unless satisfactory 
evidence is produced that the corner was actually 
located upon the ground at a point different from 
that stated in the field notes ... 
Any section corner or quarter corner that is 
identified as having been established by an official 
survey of the United States government must stand as 
being correctly located, however plain it rray appear 
that the location is wrong; because the government 
surveys cannot be changed in an action at law 
between individuals." 
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Vaught v. McClym:md 144 P.2d 612 (t·bnt 1945) citing 43 U.S.C.,\. Sections 
751, 752 and various cases) 
In ascertaining the lines of land or in 
re-establishing the lines of a survey, the footsteps 
of the original surveyor, so far as discoverable on 
the ground, should be followed and it is i.rnrrB.terial 
if the lines actually run by the original surveyor 
are inco=ect. Ayers v. Watson, 137 U.S. 584, ll 
S.Ct. 201, 34 L.Ed. 803; Galt V. 1.Jillingharn, ll F.2d 
757. 
In surveying a tract of land according to a former 
plat or survey, the surveyor's only duty is to 
relocate, upon the best evidence obtainable, the 
courses and lines at the same place where originally 
located by the first surveyor on the ground. In 
making the resurvey, he has the right to use the 
field notes of the original survey. The object of a 
resurvey is to furnish proof of the location of the 
lost lines or monuments, not to dispute the 
co=ectness of or to control the original survey. 
The ori inal survey in all cases must, whenever 
ossi le, be retrace , smce it cannot e 
disre arded or needlessly altere a ter property 
ri hts have een acquired in re iance upon it. On a 
resurvey to es tab ish ost oun ies, if the 
original corners can be found, the places where they 
were originally established are conclusive without 
regard to whether they were in fact co=ectly 
located. 8 Arn.Jur. Boundaries, Section 102, p. 319. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in adopting the rule that the Manual or 
Instructions for the Survey of the Public Lmds of the United 
States-1973 is law (Hook v. Horner, 517 P.2d 554 (Idaho 1973) and 
Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, 557 P.2d 203 (Idaho 1976) further stated that any 
survey not based thereon is not substantive evidence. Hook v. Hon1er, 
517 P.2d 554, 558 (Idaho 1973) held: 
(W)e agree with respondents' contention that without 
the field notes of the Ashley survey, or other 
evidence indicating that the survey was conducted in 
accordance with the United States ~lanual of 
Surveying Instructions ... it cannot be achnitted as 
substantive evidence ... 
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In the present case, Respondents' experts do not base their 
testiroony or methods on the Manual of Surveying InstnJCtions. 
Respondents' Brief has completely ignored the importance of the law in 
this matter, and has not specifically cited any fact in dispute, 
preferring to establish the corner on the basis of alleged stipulations, 
waivers, and the detennination of law by a jury. 
In O:Jrnia v. Putnam, 489 P. 2d 1001 (Utah 1971), the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled as illegal a surveying tedmique used by Mr. Irwin Moser 
who, interestingly was Respondents' surveyor's instnJCtor (see 
T.V. II,p.103.1.16-18). Moser's theory was stated as follows: 
(I)f you have one or more in-place original 
m:muments located anywhere in the township and you 
have the angles and distances fr= the original 
field notes, the exact location of a disputed line 
can be determined, even though it is necessary to 
cross over lost or obliterated corners." 
In the instant case, Bott (fuser' s student) , used a similar 
technique to arrive at what Respondents claim is the Northeast corner of 
Lot 12, Block 34. Bott began at the =disputed Southeast corner of Lot 
12, Block 34 and, using the scaled distances he assumed and derived fr= 
the Martineau plat, measured up to what he considered the Northeast 
corner of Lot 12. Such is not the procedure for reestablishing an 
obliterated corner or relocating a lost corner as set forth in the 
"lanual. Bott admitted he was only "somewhat familiar" with the history 
of platting of properties in Cache Co=ty (T.V.II,p.140,1.14-17) and 
based his knowledge of the law on Black's law Dictionary_, (T. V. II 
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p.106,1.7-13). It is interesting to note that &ltt erred bv 33 feet in 
this case just as his instructor, cfoser, en·ed b•; 33 feet in Cc1n1L:.i 
Putnam. 
The reason for &ltt 's sur;ey being against survey law Jnd not 
me.rely a "difference of opinion" as Resp:mdents claim in their Brief at 
page 17 is easily seen by applying Bott' s method of scaling and 
measurement from a different beginning point. By law, the recovered 
corner should be locatable fran any direction (beyond a reasonable 
doubt). As the basis for re-establishing a disputed corner, there is no 
justification for measuring in a single line from one known con1er, any 
rrore than for measuring in a single line either east-west or north south 
from any of the other known corners. Thus, there is no basis for Bott's 
preferring his measurement from the Southeast Corner of Lot 12 over a 
measurement using his method from the Northeast Corner of Block ) . 
However ·vti.en Bott' s method of scaling and measuring is used begiJming 
at the ;~ortheast Corner of Lot 17, Block 8, neither the Southeast Con1er 
of Lot 1, Block 8 nor the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 can be 
recovered. The Southeast Corner of Lot l, Block 8 is just as much in 
doubt as the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, using Bott' s 
scale-and-measure method. Therefore, even though the Southeast corner 
of Lot 1, Block 8 is just across the gravel lane from the :'ortheast 
Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, the former cannot be used to establish the 
latter. L<either point is useful in support of Bott' s contentions that 
there was ever a 66-foot road established at the gravel lane. Likewise 
700 South Street, used as a point of reference by Bott, is a recent 
addition to Block 8 and was not even anticipated by the ~1artiJ1eau Survev 
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or dl1y plats based thereon. It is therefore not evidence in support of 
the original survey and cannot be used to locate the "1ortheast Corner of 
!.Dt 12. Appellants' surveyor used the "1ortheast corner of Lot 17, Block 
8 (an illldisputed, known corner) as a reference point together with the 
Southeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 (also known and illldisputed) to 
detennine the location of the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34. 
The plats introduced by both Appellants and Respondents at trial 
were admitted only for the purpose of showing relative sizes and shapes 
of properties in the area, not to detennine actual dimensions as they 
exist on the groillld, not to detennine that a 66-foot road was ever 
established by an original survey, not to detennine the location of the 
disputed corner. They are not official maps or plats of the original 
~ withiJ1 the meaning of Section 57-5-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended) (T.V.II,p.64,1.18-p.65,l.l, also T.V.III,p.43,1.7-10) nor 
are they probative evidence according to the Manual in light of the 
evidence that exists on the groillld, including lines of possession, and 
record titles. In short, they are just drawings. 
Thus the Bott survey is not probative to detennine the location of 
an obliterated corner. 
His method is not equivalent to using proportional measurement to 
detennine a lost corner either, and therefore has no substantive value 
in detennining the disputed corner (see Cornia v. Putnam, supra. citing 
Reid V. Dunn, 201 Cal.App.2d 612, 20 Cal.Rptr. 273, 277-278 (1962)). 
Argument 2. The Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 is either an 
obliterated or a lost corner. Any party desiring to establish it at a 
particular point has the burden of proving the location beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. In the event that no one can establish the corner 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it must be relocated bv proportionate 
measurement according to the !'13.nual of Instructions for the Survey of 
the Public !..ands of the United States-1973, supra. It is not 
acceptable, for example, to use the single scale-and-measure method used 
in the Bott survey. The Washington Supreme Court discusses the 
development of Beyond A Reasonable ]):)ubt as the standard of proof in the 
case of a disputed corner in San Juan County v. Ayer, 604 P. 2d 1304 
(Wash.App. , 1980) citing the !'13.nual of Instructions for the Survey of 
the Public !..ands of the United States-1973, Sections 5-9 at p.130 (1973 
!'13.nual) : 
Both parties rely upon the !'13.nual and are in 
agreement that Washington courts and surveyors are 
required to follow the instructions of the !'13.nual. 
King v. Cannichael, 45 Wash. 127, 87 P. 1120 (1906). 
The (Washington) court first considered the 
dichotomy between a lost , as opposed to an 
obliterated, corner in King v. Cannichael, 45 Wash. 
127, 87 P. 1120 (1906) at 1121, and upheld the trial 
court's determination that the corner was lost 
without suggesting what the burden of proof must be; 
the court indicated that the case ''presented a 
question of fact only" and that "we are not inclined 
to disturb the findings of the trial court." The 
lost corner vis-a-vis obliterated corner issue 
appeared agail1 in Inrron v. Pearson, 47 Wash. 402, 92 
P. 279 (1907), and then again in Hale v. Ball, 70 
Wash. 435, 441, 126 P. 942, 944 (1912) , Where the 
(Washington) court surrrnarized the applicable rules: 
"We conceive that there is a distinction between a 
lost corner and a corner the markings of which have 
been obliterated. If no monument or marking of a 
quarter corner can be found or the testimony of its 
location be overcorre by better evidence , a court 
will decree the establishnent of a corner under the 
rule prevailing in the land deparonent of the United 
States; that is, at a point equidistant from the 
section corners. But it does not follow that, if 
there be evidence of a corner which has been 
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destroyed or obliterated by the lapse of time, a 
court will direct the establishment of a corner 
under the rule stated, or any other rule, for the 
law establishes an obliterated corner where the 
surveyor actually located it, and not Where it ought 
to be located by a correct survey. 11 
The standard of proof then evolved in Washington from "a 
preponderance of the evidence," to "clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence," and then to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard clearly 
set forth in the language of the Manual. 
The rationale for requiring proof 'beyond a 
reasonable doubt" has been well stated in Greer v. 
Squire, 9 Wash. 359, 364, 3 7 P. 545 (1894) . There 
are strong policy considerations favoring the 
retention of a corner once marked on the ground by 
the government surveyor even though that is a point 
which other surveyors might upon resurveys agree is 
in error. The directive of the Manual reflects 
experiences accumulated over the years by those who 
surveyed the continental United States and 
anticipated the problems of ascertaining obliterated 
corners. Their considered judgrrent that the 
establishment of an "obliterated corner" shoUld 
require the highest degree of proof reflects an 
acknowledgen-ent that error was bound to be made by 
surveyors subject to human frailties. 'lhus the GI.D 
prefers the reestalbis&nent of a lost corner by the 
proportionate method rather than reliance upon 
evidence of its original location that is open to 
doubt. To lend certainty to an area that might 
otherwise lead to "great confusion and litigation," 
the Manual remes proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of the original ocation of the point. 
We hold that a art see to recover the location 
o an o literated surveying point must sustain t e 
burden of 1'.ro1al the location of that point beyond 
a reaosnab e ou t. 
The policy basis set forth above is compatible with that set forth 
in Cragin v. Powell, 128 U.S. 691, 9 S.Ct. 203, 32 L.Ed. 566 (1888) 
cited in Greer v. Squire, 9 Wash.359, 364, 37 P. 545 (1894) as follows: 
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The power to make and correct surveys of the public 
land belongs to the political department of the 
goveniment; "and the reason of this rule," says the 
court, quoting ... Haydel v. Dufresne, 17 How.23, (30, 
15 L.Ed. 115 (1854)) "is that great confusion and 
liti ation would ensue ~the judicial tribwials, 
state an ederal, were pennitte to inter ere .:md 
overthrow the public surve s on no other grow1d than 
an opunoll t t t ey coun ave t e It.Dr ill t e 
field better done, and divisions more equitably 
made, than the department of public lands cound do.'' 
Thus (the Washington) court early declared that "the 
true corner is where the United States Surveyor 
established it, notwithstanding its location may not 
be such as is designated in the plat or field notes. 
The Washington court in San Juan v. Ayer, supra. citing State v. 
Green, 91 Wash.2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979), reconsideration granted, 92 
Hash. 2d 1103 (1979) discussed the standard of appelo.te review and 
concluded by holding that: 
Despite the seemingly higher standard adopted by the 
court in "Se o" for appellate review of clear, 
cogent an conVlilcing evi ence, t e stanaaid for 
review of beyond a reasonable doubt evidence re:nains 
the "substantial evidence test." 
The Utah Supreme Court has since 1937 (see Henrie v. Hyer, 70 P.2d 
154, 156 (Utah 1937)) recognized that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
required to establish an obliterated corner. 
It was prejudicial error in this case not to require the 
Respondents to prove the location of the obliterated corner beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Argument 3. It was also prejudicial error to sul:mit this case to a 
jury. There are no material questions of fact which need to be resolvecl 
to detennine the location of the disputed corner (in spite of the 
general allegations of Respondents' counsel in their Brief). /\ppellants 
and Respondents essentially agree on the facts. Bott' s measuranents to 
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known points are not in dispute. In fact, all survey rneasurEIDents 
presented were in agreement to within a few feet. Other pertinent facts 
such as the nature and location of old fences, etc. , are not in dispute 
(see Surrrnary of Facts above). \.Jhat is in dispute are the legal 
implications of the facts and Bott' s application of the facts to unknown 
poli1ts. The application of the facts to determine a point is a rratter 
of carefully developed law (see Manual of Surveying Instructions, 
supra.) Thus Appellants contest the Respondents' application of law to 
the facts of this case, not the facts thEIDsel ves. (See also Sections 
78-21-1 and 3 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), Holland v. Wilson, 
327 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1958), and Appellants' Brief pp. 21-22.) 
Argurrent 4. The Supreme Court may reverse the verdict in this 
matter or grant a new trial on the basis of the verdict not belilg 
supported by substantial evidence and because substantial, prejudicial 
errors were comnitted at trial, including: 
a. Sul:xnitting this matter of law to a jury. 
b. Failure to require Respondents to prove their case beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
c. Faillilg to propertly instruct the jury (see Appellants' 
Brief, pp.23-26) 
d. Faillilg to grant judgp!ent notwithstanding the verdict or 
in the alternative a new trial. 
State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1977), 
This Court will notice the failure to give an 
instruction even though it was not requested when 
the failure to give it would plainly result in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
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State v. Evans, No. 18482 Utah State Bulletin, August 15, 1983, 
We recognize that, had the instructions which were 
given been erroneous to such an extent that they 
prevented a fair determination of the issues or 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, we are at 
liberty to notice the error irrespective of 
counsel's failure to preserve it.'' Citations 
omitted. 
Anderson v. Toone, No. 17924 Utah State Bulletin, October 15, 1983 
citing Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982), 
The trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny 
a irotmo for a new trial and we do not reverse a 
denial unless the 'evidence to support the verdict 
was completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
imreasonable and unjust. ' (citations omitted). 
Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D. Company, No. 17546 Utah 
State Bulletin, September 15, 1983 citing Williams v. Lloyd, 16 
Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (1965), 
This Court has occasionally exercised its discretion 
in the absence of proper objections and reviewed 
instructions given or not given. But we have said 
that this should be done 'only under ur.usual 
circumstances where the interests of justice 
urgently so demand. ' 
Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980) 
citing Nelson v. Watts, 563 P.2d 798, 799 (Utah 1977), 
In viewing this evidence, this Court will upset the 
jury verdict only upon a showing by the appealing 
party that the evidence so clearly preponderates in 
his favor reasonable people could not differ on the 
outcome of the case. Also, in determining if there 
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict this Court will consider those facts which 
ID'.lSt strongly support the verdict and where there is 
any conflict in the evidence this Court will 
consider as true that evidence which supports the 
verdict. 
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State v. Pierce, 655 p.2d 677 (Utah 1982), 
This can be done (entertain an issue for the first 
time on appeal) in rare cases under Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, or under such exceptions as 
this Court considers of momentous concern in 
protecting constitutional rights previously waived. 
(citations omitted.) 
State v. Lesley, ~o. 18038 Utah State Bulletin, O::tober 1, 1983, citing 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
This Court has discretion to review the allegedly 
erroneous admission of evidence when the grounds of 
objection are not clearly or correctly stated. 
Argument 5. To permit the judgment and decision of the District 
Court to stand in light of substantial, prejudicial error, denies 
Appellants equal protection of the law, guaranteed pursuant to Article 
I, Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah, and Amendment XDJ, Section 1, 
of the Constitution of the United States. It also violates Appellants' 
right to due process provided in Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of Utah and Amendment XDJ, Section 1 of the Constitution of 
the United States. 
Furtherirore, the decision impacts on others, not parties to this 
action so as to deny them equal protection of the law, guaranteed 
pursuant to Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah, and 
Amendment XDJ, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States and 
violates their right to due process provided in Article I, Section 7 of 
the Constitution of Utah and Amendrrent XDJ, Section 1 of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
To deprive Appellants of the right to rely on a survey corners set 
by law beyond a reasonable doubt, is to selectively apply the law in 
violation of Appellants' right to equal protection. To establish an 
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obliterated or lost corner except as provideJ bv Ln-1 \'-;:,, Lltl':, 
Appellants' right to due process. 
To permit a j udg,nent or decision to impact on the propertv ri c;hts 
of others not parties to the dispute to w1settle their propert·: 
descriptions, denies them equal protection and due process as well. 
Appellants now reply to the Respondents' Brief point by point. 
Point L (see Respondents' Brief (RB) p. 1, I~ature of the Case) 
\.Jhether Respondents or Appellants have title to the disputeJ 
property depends on the location of the beginning points in their deeJs 
as intended by the deed writers, not merely as originally surveyed. 
Contrary to Respondents' assertion that "the parties waived all 
other claims," Appellants never stipulated to refrain from reformin.2 
their deeds, to give Respondents more land than their pleadings called 
for, or to give up any other rights of possession in the event JJ1 
"original" ;~ortheast Corner of Lot 12 were located at some point other 
than the one presently relied upon. 
Point 2. (see RB p.2 paragraph 1, Statement of Facts) 
With regard to Respondents' assertion that Appellants began 
claiming land north of a fence existing in 1969 shortly after Appellants 
acquired their land; there was no fence on roughly the west half of the 
property (T.V.I, p.35,1.11-13, T.V.II, p.76, 1.2-9 see Appellants' Brief 
p. 28, note 7) . Respondents extended the partwl angular fence to the 
west boundary line in about 1977. It has been taken Jown, re-angled and 
disputed ever since. 
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In any event, such fact, even if true. is not supportive of the 
Respondents' claim for the location of the :iortheast Corner of Lot 12, 
Block 34 as originally surveyed. 
Point 3. (see RB p. 2 paragraph 2, Statement of Facts) 
Respondents' statement, "It was discovered that the original 
northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34 ... was 33 feet south of where 
Plaintiffs claim." is false. No evidence was presenr:ed at trial in 
suppcrt of such a staterrent nor would such evidence been probative to 
locate the disputed corner. Respcndents' statement should alert the 
Court that Respondents , not Appellants, devised the idea to =ve the 
corner, which even they believed until shorly before trial, was at the 
location claimed by Appellants. 
Point 4. (see RB p. 2 last sentence, Statement of Facts) 
Regarding Respondents' claim that they are now entitled to land 
south of the existing fence (land never before in dispute) ; Respondents 
acquire no title to any property by virtue of this action nor are they 
entitled to a rerredy which they have not pled and for which Appellants 
have had no notice. (see Washington :~ickel Mining & Alloys, Inc. v. 
M3.rtin, supra. ) 
Point 5. (see RB p. 3 paragraph 2, Statement of Facts) 
Holland v. Wilson, 327 P. 2d 250, 252 (Utah 1958) set forth the 
standard that a jury trial was appropriate only to decide questions of 
fact. Even if the District Court did not understand prior to trial that 
there were no factual issues in this matter requiring jury resolution, 
the O::lurt should still have granted Appellants' Motion for Judgment 
:'otwithstanding the Verdict or for a [~ew Trial. To permit a jury to 
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decide the law is to require of them the expertise of , j •1c:ge n 1d 1 s 
itself contrary to law. In short, even though the j ur:; did i L:; best 1, 1 
determine "a preponderance of the evidence", i Ls verdict c"ould net have 
been anything but arbitrary. 
Appellants respectfully sul::mit that the verdict in this :ruLter, 
if allowed to stand, establishes "stipulation". ''jur:: determination ,,f 
law", and the standard of "preponderance of the illusory evidence" as 
legal methods for relocating obliterated or lost corners. 
Point 6. (see RB pp.3-5, Right to Jury Trial) 
Respondents' assertion that they are entitled to a j ur:; trial i .~ 
only valid to the extent that there are factual questions to be decided. 
Appellants objected to a trial by jury because the issues to be resolved 
were legal, and because there were no essential facts in dispute. 
In spite of Respondents' claims that the location of the disputed 
comer was a question of fact, the definition and location of the 
;iortheast Corner of wt 12, Block 34 can be matters both of law and 
fact. But the facts material to the location of the corner are not in 
dispute (see Argument 1 above). There is no substantial, probative, or 
lawful evidence which supports the Resp.1ndents' position and it 1vas 
prejudicial error to refer the matter to a jury for determination. 
Point 7. (see RB p.5. Right to Jury Trial) 
Respondents' staterrEnt, "At trial Plaintiffs contended that the 
original ,lortheast Con1er had moved and changed from where it had been 
placed," is false. Appellants made no such statement Rather. 
Appellants maintained that the :~ortheast Con1er of IJ1t L.'. Bl,1ck l'+ :s 
.md al·.,,1T1s has ':Jeen at what is presently called the "Lrrsen Fence 
l):in1er." 
Resprmdents contend that the original northeast corner ... "was 
located •..Jhere the plats, surveys, deeds and other records indicated it 
WDuld be, i.e. 1320 feet directly north of the southeast corner of 1.Dt 
12, Block 34 ... '' The deeds, plats, lawful surveys and other records 
indicate plainly on their face that 
a. the northeast corner of 1.Dt 12, Block 34 is approximately 
1350 feet north of the southeast corner of 1.Dt 12, Block 34. 
b. the S01.ltheast corner of 1.Dt 1, Block 8 is approximately 
1350 south of the northeast corner of 1.Dt 17, Block 8 
c. there is a 33-foot road separating then. 
d. Respondents' assumptions regarding a "standard" 1320 foot 
Block, the existence of a 66-foot road, and the location of the south 
line and southeast corner of Block 8 are completely unfounded. 
(Respondents actually derive their measurenents from the scale of a 
plat, as previously discussed, in spite of all other deeds and other 
records, and not from deeds, official plats or official surveys as they 
claim.) 
Point 8. (see RB p. 5ff, ARGl.MENTS II and III) 
In spite of Respondents' general assertions, there is no 
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict or the District 
Court's decision, and there has been substantial and prejudicial error 
Lorrmitted at trial. (See Arguments above). 
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Point 9. (see RB p. S, paragraph 1. Evidence in Supp_•rL of Jue .. 
Verdict) 
Respondents' list of "evidence" in support cJf the j ur:1' s •;erdi cl 
contains nothing material or substantial that supp<Jrts their c L1im fc_or 
locating the disputed corner in a manner prescribed by law as set forth 
in the i'lanual of Surveying Instructions - 1973. (see Arguments above) . 
Point 10. (see RB p. S, last paragraph, Evidence in Support of Jurv 
Verdict) 
Appellants' do not object to Respondents' right to use evidence 
sul:mitted by Appellants at trial. Appellants do object however to the 
unlawful interpretation of the evidence beyond the purposes for which it 
was admitted, specifically in regard to the >artineau Plat, Exhibit "'l. 
It is not proper and lawful survey practice to conclude from a scaled 
measurement of an Lmofficial plat the exact '.Tleasurements of a L.Jt, 
especially in light of roore conclusive evidence. The >Jartineau Plat is 
a valuable and useful docurrent. But there was no evidence that it •.vas 
established on the grotmd or approved as an official plat. :Jo :=ielJ 
notes of a corresponding survey were found, and it gave no calls for the 
dimensions of Lot 12. It was drawn to scale, thus showing approxilrate 
anticipated dimensions and relationships between various properties. 
Respondents' confuse the admissibility of evidence with its 
probative value as established by law, e.g. that evidence or 
long-standing lines of possession on the grotmd which conform with 
record titles take precedence over tax plats aml measurements i1: 
detennining the foot-steps of the original sur.:e·1or. (see Diehl 
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Z:mger, 39 Xich 601 (1878) and also Brown, Evidence and Procedures for 
i'Dunclar1 Location, cited in Appellants' Brief at pp.17-19). 
111ough Respondents claim the priority and relative weight of 
evidence is the sole province of the jury, the cases cited refer to fact 
questions and not issues of law. 
11 C.J.S. Boundaries, Section 118, p. 728. 
TI1e relative weight to be given evidence of disputed 
bcundaries such as natural monuments, artificial 
marks , courses and distances, and the like, is 
ordinarily a question of law. 
Point 11. (see RB pp.8-9, Evidence in Support of Jury Verdict) 
With regard to Respondents' claimed measurements, Appellants do not 
dispute the ability of Bott to measure distances in the field. 
Appellants do, however, dispute the purported legal conclusions of his 
survey. 
Respondents have the burden of establishing the disputed corner 
beyond a reasonable doubt in spite of what Appellants prove. 
Respondents' claims cannot be established by default. 
Point 12. (see RB pp. 9-13, Evidence in Support of Jury Verdict) 
The Eden Akers subdivision (Exhibit 24) referred to as Respondents' 
evidence is relatively recent (1961), is not in Lot 12, and its 
dimensions are irrelevant to a determination of the disputed corner. 
None of the other plats sul:mitted by Respondents purport to be 
surveys or official survey placs and are merely to show general 
relationships between the properties. 
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Point 13. (see RB p.10. line 9ff, Evidence in Support of .Jur:1 
Verdict) 
Respondents claim to know the location of the north side <Jf 801) 
South Street. However. the position of the north side of 800 South 
Street is unknown. given the 66-foot right-of-way asserted bv the Bott 
survey. The road is actually only 33 feet wide. Thus Respondents 
cannot use the position of the north side of 800 South Street to 
determine the south side of the road. If the original surveyor actually 
intended and established a 33-foot wide road, as presently exists. and 
not the 66-foot road Respondents claim. all other points relied upon in 
Lot 12 match with measurements called for in the deeds. not the Bott 
survey. 
Point 14. (see RB p.11. Evidence in Support of Jury Verdict) 
In trying to prove that Lot 12 is 1320 feet long. Respondents rel:• 
on non-legal and non-probative evidence (illusory evidence) which even 
if accepted in the light most favorable to Respondents' case is 
inconclusive. Respondents ignore conclusive proof that it is longer. 
Some of the evidence ignored is briefly outlined here. 
(a) The aerial photograph (Exhibit 3) and measurements in the field 
(including Respondents' own measurements if interpreted properly) show 
excess land in the ground covered by the Martineau Plat (see map in 
Appellants' Brief). This is not by any means an unusual situation (see 
Appellants I Brief p. 15 and o'<Cornia v. Putnam. 489 p. 2d 1001 (Utah 
1971)). 
(b) The Kreisie to Kreisie deed of 1943 (see Exhibit l~) 
transfered the north part of Lot 12 as a parcel e.xactly 660 feet (10 
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chains) long, and the entire south part as a parcel to include the 
remaining distance, (referred to as 12..:l chains more or less). Thus the 
"north part" is not equal to the "south part" and the excess present 
alw-ays remained in the "south part" of lDt 12. Thus also, the length of 
1.Dt 12 is longer than the 2 x 660 feet or 1320 feet claimed by 
Respondents and Respondents' method is proven conclusively to be in 
error and non-probative. The M.D. Hanm:md to Mattie Hansen deed 
(Exhibit 39?) agrees with Appellants' evidence and the Kreisie deeds 
above-mentioned. 
(c) Hickman's testim:my regarding the "standard historical 
distance of lots", is irrelevant, misleading and unfounded because the 
size of lots in the actual area of interest is clear from \IDcontested 
survey measurements and the aerial photo presented in the trial. The 
length of Block 8 and lDt 12 are each considerably greater than 2 x 1320 
feet implied by Mr. Bott (see appellants brief map, pp.27, 28.) Thus 
there is excess land over that suggested by scaling from the Martineau 
Survey. Inclusions of this excess land obviously makes the length of 
l.Dt 12 greater than "a standard 1320 feet". Neasure:nents involving 700 
South street are irrelevant because this street is not called for in the 
!'13.rtineau Plat. If the present 33-foot gravel lane at 800 South lane 
were to be widened to 66 feet, best evidence indicates that the extra 33 
feet might better come from the north side of the present lane rather 
than from the south side. Thus the southeast corner of 1.Dt 1, Block 8 
would be located 33 feet north of where Bott assumes it to be. Recall, 
however, that there is evidence that a 66-foot roadway was never 
actually laid out in the filed. The roadway ends altogether to the west 
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and to the east, and a setback of ten feet '-'11 edch side nf the prcse11t 
33 feet lane was called for d few vears back in Ct11tic:ipdtiu11 , ,f 
subdivisions. The 33 foot lane is equitdbb locdted, and is consistent 
with deed calls in l..Dt 12. 
(d) Respondents argue that the deed from '.-!. D. Hamrond to >lattie 
Hansen in 1877 indicates that l.Dt 12, Block 34 was 1320 feet long. 
Actually, their assumption that the "north part of Int 12" was the same 
length as the south part of 1.Dt 12 is in error as indicated by 
Plaintiffs' exhibit number 12. in the deed of Kreasie to Kreasie the 
"North part of l.Dt 12" is described as being "40 rods" (10 chains) long. 
The "South part of lDt 12" however, is described as extending from its 
south boundary "10. 2 chains South from the '.\lortheast corner of said 
lot". Thus this e.xhibit illustrates two points, viz. (1) lDt 12, Block 
34 was considerably longer than 1320 feet in the 1943 era dnd earlier, 
and (2) the excess land was in the "South part". 'This "South part" was 
eventually deeded to Hansen. Thus the Respondents' argurent has no 
basis in fact. The deeds, even in the light TOCJst favorable to the 
Respondents' case are clear on their face, despite Respondents' 
assertions to the contrary. 
Point 15. (see RB p .12 last paragraph, Evidence in Support of Jill''.' 
Verdict) 
Appellants do not object to the admission of the Martineau Plat as 
evidence, nor to its proper use, that is, to show relationships between 
properties not actual dimensions from its scale. The >Jartineau Plat was 
never offered by Plaintiffs as an Official clap or Offici31 Plat of m 
actual survey. Indeed the >Tattie Hansen Deed dated Januar:1 12, 187~ 
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used the designation "wt 12" three years prior to the Martineau Plat of 
1'380. The oft-referred-to >la.rti.neau Plat is just as Respondents 
surveyors admit, merely a drawi.ng which purports to be based on the 
>Iartineau Survey. It neither indicates when said survey was performed 
or that ~la.rtinea.u actually ma.de the drawing. 
The Respondents' claim that other plats in evidence are "ancient 
documents" is wholly without merit. ;'lone of the plats sutmitted by 
Respondents as evidence qualify as ancient documents for purposes of 
this case. Some are not relevant. Some are not verified. Some are tax 
plats. Age is not the sole determina..nt of an ancient document nor does 
age alone endow an prior irrelevant document ·Ni.th relevance or 
materiality. Such documents must still be interpreted on their face, in 
light of all other evidence. Respondents' documentary evidence supports 
Appellants' position when viewed within the frame=rk of the other 
undisputed facts. 
Point 16. (see RB bottom half of p. 13, Verdict Effects Only 
Parties to Tri.al) 
Despite Respondents' assertions, the results of this trial, if 
allowed to stand, do affect the accepted position of the Northeast 
C.Orner of Lot 12, Block 34 for landowners in l.ot 12 not parties to this 
action. The C.Ourt has established an obliterated or lost corner at a 
location not previously relied on. The location therefore impacts on 
the validity of all deeds which use this point of reference. 
Furthenrore, if those deeds are subject to reformation, as the 
Respondents claim, then the Appellants' and Respondents' deeds are also 
subject to that same reformation and Appellants are still entitled to 
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the disputed property. Appellants did not stipulate avrav their right to 
deed reforTTl3.tion in such a case. Thus the lower court decision does not 
reoldve the boundary dispute. 
Point 17. (see RB pp. 14-15, Appellant's Failure to Object) 
Appellants objected to the granting of a jury trial , to the jury 
inst=tions used and moved for judgrrent notwithstanding the verdict. 
As to the jury instnJCtions, there is no question that there was no 
court reporter in the in-chambers discussions and that counsel for 
Appellants failed to enter the objections to the jury instnJCtions in 
the record during the jury deliverations. Appellants attempted to 
renedy the problem by amending the record. The jury instnJCtions set 
forth in Appellants' Brief are verbatim from the proposed instructions 
and the given instructions copies of which were at the time of trial 
given to all parties and the originals of which Appellants' believe have 
been transmitted to the Suprerre Court for review. 
The District Court might well have rendered the matter of the jury 
instructions moot by reviewing the evidence and granting judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Appellants' ~btion. 
Even if Appellants had made no effort to amend the record there has 
still been substantial prejudicial error corrrnitted which rmre than 
permits this Court to intervene (see Arguments above.) 
~oint 18. (see RB p.16, Conclusions) 
Appellants' conclusions differ in essential ways from those of the 
Respondents. 
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d. Appelld11ts have clearlv shown substantial and prejudicial error 
in the proceedings, that the verdict is not supported by substantial 
eviJence, and that the verdict is against law (see Arguments above). 
b. The Respondents' statement "the essence of the Plaintiffs' 
cippeal is a challenge of the facts not the law." is absolutely wrong. 
The appellants do not challenge the facts, only the way the Respondents 
attempt to use them. The proper use of the facts is clearly stated in 
surJey law dS given in the Manual of Instructions for the Survey of the 
Public Lands of the United States - 1973. Measurements of distances, 
and the location of known, real objects like fences and lines of 
possession, are essentially known and agreed to by all parties and 
surveyors. These are the facts. How these facts are to be used to 
detennine the intent of the original surveyor (follow the steps of the 
original surveyor) in the restoration of the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, 
Block 34 is a matter of law, carefully spelled out, whether the corner 
be obliterated or lost. It is not a subject for jury detennination. 
c. The Appellants have no objection to the Defendants' use of 
evidence the Appellants introduced. Appellants welcane clarificaitons 
from either side. 
d. Respondents' evidence, including the Bott Survey, clearly 
indicates that all parties acknowledge the intent of the deed writers to 
begin the property descriptions at the point claimed by Appellants as 
the .-:ortheast Comer of Lot 12, Block 34 and oft referred to as the 
Larsen Fence Comer. 
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e. The jury should be corrmended for their efforts to weigh the 
evidence. It is unfortunate that they were asked to decide questions of 
law. 
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cmcwsrms 
Appellants have dem::mstrated that the j udgrrent of the District 
Omrt is clearly against law and is not supported by substantial 
evidence. Appellants have also indicated that substantial, prejudicial 
errors were corrrnitted at trial. 
The evidence now before the Court is sufficient beyond a reasonable 
doubt to establish the Northeast Corner of l.Dt 12, Block 34, Providence 
Survey of Farms at the location claimed by Appellants at the point oft 
referred to at trial as the lBrsen Fence Corner. 
Whether the location is for the purpose of detennining the intent 
of the deed writers--comn:m grantors of the parties--or to determine the 
"footsteps" and intent of the original surveyor, the point is the same. 
Only Appellants' surveys comply with the legal requirements set 
forth in the Manual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public IBnds 
of the United States - 1973 for the re-establishnent of obliterated 
corners. Furthenmre, if, after reviewing the evidence, this Court 
feels that neither party has established the disputed corner beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Appellants' surveys have already met the requirements 
for the lawful restoration of a lost corner. Both methods indicate the 
true location of the Northeast Corner of l.Dt 12, Block 34, Providence 
Farm Survey to be as Appellants claim. 
Appellants respectfully request that the Judgflleilt of the District 
Court be reversed and that Judgflleilt be entered in their favor, or in the 
alternative, that a New Trial be granted. 
DATED this 25th day of April, 1984. 
-?:/.~ 
/ / ,/" ,:/:- ( / , --/ 
·~B-IlL~-HAi~.~=SEN~~~~~~-"------'~-L71 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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